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DIETER WANDSCHNEIDER 
19. THE PROBLEM OF MASS IN HEGEL 
The way in which Hegel develops the categories of place and motion leads 
on to his exposition of matter, which he presents as the existent unity of space 
and time. In his early work, he also takes these categories to be basic to 
the reciprocal relation between motion and matter. He argues that a change 
in position can only be meaningful if it is possible to relate it to a point in 
space which remains unaffected by it. In his view, the spatio-temporal being 
determining place constitutes the essential nature of materiality. Matter is 
therefore mass, and the realization of place is the essence of mass. 
Given such an exposition, one might well ask for the exact meaning being 
attached to the word "mass". Although the question is left unanswered in the 
Philosophy of Nature, there is evidence in his Jena writings that Hegel was 
by no means unaware of its importance. The paradigm he uses to answer 
it is that of circular motion and rotation, which he often associates with the 
movement of the planets. In the first instance, however, he employs it in the 
much more fundamental sense of the property of rotation, which involves the 
centre of rotation remaining self-identical. Rotation is therefore motion in 
one and the Same place. 
Building on this basic principle he accounts for such movement as the 
"representation of rest in motion". The unity of rest and motion realized 
in this way serves him as a model for the massivity of matter. This in turn 
provides him with a starting-point for a discussion of the theoretical principles 
underlying the concept of mass. 
What is more, this conceptual framework makes possible the discussion 
of the phenomena of inertia and of the massless matter which is empirically 
realized in light. What is important here is the symmetrical character of 
circular motion. It is a well-known fact that the symmetry of physical being 
in respect of variation in time gives rise to the law of the conservation of 
energy. Basically, such a principle of symmetry is already implied at this 
point. 
The concept of mass or rest-mass, to use a term current in contemporary 
science, is still an Open question in physics, since it is still not possible to 
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explain the mass values of elementary particles.' It is true that research has 
yielded an immense amount of information concerning the micro-structure of 
matter, but we still do not understand the essence of massivity, and the extent 
to which it is related to inertia or the possibility of rest. As something which is 
to all intents and purposes not notional, the phenomenon of mass has always 
been a matter of fundamental difficulty in the philosophy of nature. Most of 
the important philosophers - Plato, Kant, Schelling and Hegel - have tried 
their skill at dealing with it. Can philosophy help physics in this respect? Of 
Course not! Philosophy is not a matter of making empirical investigations 
superfluous, nor should it ever attempt to do so. Its task is to lay bare the 
principles underlying nature. And as long as it has not done this, the essence 
of nature will remain incomprehensible, even in those fields in which it is 
being empirically investigated. 
It seems to me that in respect of theoretical principles, Hegel's Philosophy 
of Nature Opens up possibilities which hitherto have remained very largely 
unutilized. This is certainly true of his analysis of the problem of mass, 
which only concerns part of the problem of matter. Although his conception 
of gravity and gravitation ought also to be kept in mind in this connection, it 
is mainly the character of the time-bridging identity of matter, the potentiality 
it has for rest, its massivity, with which we shall be concerned. 
The line of argument relating to this in the main text of the Encyclopedia 
is too condensed, and therefore needs to be clarified. What is more, since 
there is no really elaborated theory of the dialectic of nature, it is not only 
desirable but necessary to take a look at some of Hegel's original intuitions, 
which in many cases lost their distinctness in his later works, or fell victim 
to the exigencies of his System. Philosophy makes use not only of reasoning 
but also of intuition. In respect of the mass which offers persistent resistance 
to a notional solution, it is important to find a suitable image for developing 
a first approximation to the understanding of the question. According to 
Hegel, the metaphors of circular and gyratory motion are well-suited for this. 
Here it is essential to clarify what we can gain by a structural interpretation 
of such ideas. I also think that an attempt has to be made to bring out the 
contemporary relevance of the topic. Doing so is always a delicate matter, 
but it is a must if undertakings of the present kind are to be anything more 
than philological expositions of Hegel's philosophy, if they are to make a real 
contribution to reflection on the foundations of physics. 
In what follows, I shall first give a brief review of the arguments put 
forward in the Encyclopedia; then I shall analyse Hegel's interpretation of 
circular and gyratory motion and discuss the possibility of bringing out the 
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relevance of his ideas; finally, I shall draw certain conclusions in respect of 
the principles involved in comprehending the divisibility of matter, and in 
putting fonvard a philosophical interpretation of the theory of relativity. 
A. MATER 
Hegel's view of matter is the outcome of his concept of motion, which has 
therefore to be briefly sketched. He maintains that the categories of space and 
time are basically interrelated: everything spatial necessarily has a reference 
to other things in space. It is, however, a reference which remains simply 
implicit in merely spatial relations. This immanent differentiation is made 
explicit in the concept of change, that is, in time. Change, however, only 
takes place in space. This reciprocal relation between the categories of space 
and time means that both have to be thought of as elements of a unity which 
contains everything. The concrete significance of this is that the point, the 
fundamental determination of space, has to be supplemented by a temporal 
element. This gives rise to the category of place, which in Hegel's view has 
not only a spatial but also a temporal significance. His concept of place, 
therefore, always carries the extra connotation of change. At the level of 
mechanics, this is simply a spatial and not yet a qualitative change. As such 
a place always involves a change in place, it is in fact motion. 
This poses a problem, however, for a change of place, or motion, can only 
occur in relation to a spatial point, which remains at rest, and is therefore 
' 
unaffected by the change. Motion and rest belong together in a dialectical 
manner. How, then, is a place specified as being at rest? From a formal point 
of view, since a single place remains identical in time, it does not change. The 
negative element of change, contained in the concept of place is here negated 
again. The place in rest is therefore the negation of a negation, which is 
intro-reflexion or being-for-self. The nature of this being-for-self endows the 
single place at rest with a self-identity which bridges time, and so constitutes 
a single being-for-self. In Hegel's view, it is this that constitutes the primary 
nature of materiality, which is conceptualized as inert, corpuscular, single 
mass. First and foremost, therefore, inert matter or mass constitutes place, 
that is, its own place, which retains its self-identity in time.* 
Here mass is understood as a synthesis of an isolated existence in space and 
a being-for-self which remains identical in time. Hegel associates this being- 
for-self with the impenetrability of matter, with its having an independent 
I resistant existence and therefore being something tangible and visible. Place 
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has already been characterized as a spatio-temporal synthesis. According to 
Hegel, however, this is only "the posited identity of space and time", their 
explicit conceptional connection. Beyond such matter is "the immediate 
identically existent unity" of both, that is, a being in space which is real 
since it remains identical in time, and has a spatio-temporal existence, a real 
"existing being-for-self 
How is one to regard such an "immediate existent unity" of space and 
time? It is this question alone which will now be considered. Hegel's very 
brief remarks in the 1830 Encyclopedia do not supply much information on 
the subject. The line of argument he deveIops concerns the phenomenon 
of gravity, which he Sees as the primary determination of material bodies, 
and as presupposing massivity. Incidentially, gravity must not be confused 
with gravitation, which in Hege17s usage signifies the gravitationally struc- 
tured properties of systems of bodies. When we deal with the concept of 
mass, we shall consider the premise underlying his conception of gravity 
and gravitation, which in the Encyclopedia itself is not given any further 
c~nsideration.~ 
B. CIRCULAR MOTION 
The Additions to the Encyclopedia, which have their origin in earlier works 
or in Hegel's lectures, are of particular importance in throwing light on this 
subject. The relevant passages in this case originate from his Jena writings. 
The paradigm he uses in order to illustrate the problematic unity of space and 
time is that of circular motion. His argument runs as f o l l ~ w s : ~  
The circular motion which returns to itself is "in its exteriority equally 
closed ... as the point", that is, its starting- and its final-point coincide. 
According to Hegel, this has important structural consequences: circular 
motion is therefore: 
the present and the past and the future, which form a whole. It is the 
neutrality of these dimensions which makes the past in exactly the Same 
sense a future, since what follows becomes what has been. Only thus is 
their necessary paralysis posed in space: it is the re-established immediacy. 
Present, past, future, "have become a unit within circular motion; this unit is 
the spatial or existent unity of these meanings". On the basis of the topological 
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connection of the circular line, the advance from the starting-point is also a 
return to the Same point. In this way, a motion into the future is also a return 
into the past. Past, present and future, which Hegel refers to as the dimensions 
of time, are united and brought into a synthesis as it were. As "the relation 
of present, past and future", the whole is "something permanent". The pure 
present would not be permanent, and could not explain the time-bridging 
being-for-self of mass, which is characterized by the paralysis of the time 
dimensions in circular m ~ t i o n . ~  
In its state of unity, circular motion remains related to one and the Same 
point, that is, its centre - which remains unchanged within the motion. Cir- 
cular motion is therefore that, "which is extinct in itself', or "in its   entre“.^ 
This is certainly an extraordinarily suggestive illustration of the unity of 
the determinations of space and time. The primary determination of space 
is the point, which is Seen as the possibility of localization. Motion contains 
a temporal element. Since circular motion represents the CO-existence of 
spatial-point and temporal-change in one state, it is the paradoxical form of 
motion in a single place, of localized motion. Hegel therefore characterizes 
it as "positing time in place and place in time". The centre is here to be 
regarded as "the restoration of place as being immobile" - not of the point in 
space from which the argumentation started, however, but as the result of a 
synthesis of the determinations of space and time. "It is the restored concept 
of duration, the motion which is extinct in itself. The mass, the permanence 
' that has condensed of its own accord, is posited."8 
Mass is therefore essentially spatio-temporal. Although it exists in space, 
it also has temporal existence as something which has duration. In order to 
assure ourselves of the temporal being of mass, we cannot simply put a clock 
beside it, for we might very well ask what would happen if we took the clock 
away? Mass must therefore possess a temporal nature from the very start. It 
must in itself be motion, a motion, however, which also remains at the Same 
point in space. In this sense, circular motion serves Hegel as a model for a 
time-bridging being-for-self of massive matter: 
The being-for-self is not this immediacy, however, for its concept is that 
of a motion returning into itself. What has duration is for itself, being 
nothing but what it is; it is self-unification ... Mass therefore consists of 
this continual motion, being simply immediate. 
Matter and motion therefore belong basically together: "Just as there is no 
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motion without matter, so there is no matter without motion." The spatio- 
temporal being-for-self of mass is to be understood as a connection of rest 
and motion in one and the Same state of a f fa i r~ .~  
This interpretation was taken up by the advocates of dialectical materi- 
alism, who reduced the structure to a handy formula. Engels was the main 
proponent. According to him, "it is easy enough: motion is the being of 
matter. Never and nowhere has there been matter without motion, nor could 
this ever be the case. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as 
motion without matter." What remains only a mere assertion in Engels, car- 
rying no conceptional consequences, corresponds to Hegel's basic attempt to 
relate matter to the structure of space and time itself by using the concept of 
motion - "the immediate identically existent unity of b ~ t h " . ~ ~  
Naturally enough, Hegel also considers the movement of the planets in 
connection with circular motion. He had already dealt with the subject in his 
Dissertation of 1801 .I1 It is not the empirical aspect of the problem which is 
of primary interest to him. He believes that he has also discovered in these 
forms of motion a general principle of material being. This is evident from 
certain of his statements: "the whole form of the solar system constitutes the 
concept of matter;" and "the determinations of form constituting the solar 
system are the determinations of matter itself."12 On the other hand, he also 
tries to establish on this basis a kind of a priori understanding of the Keplerian 
laws. For him, the principle of circular motion is of primary philosophical 
importance. Incidentally, it can, in fact, be regarded as the basic configuration 
of his system. 
Because of its reference to a centre which is at rest, Hegel in his earliest 
writings on the subject regards circular motion as a model for massivity, 
for the time-bridging identity, duration and locality of mass. He Sees it as 
a reference point for motion that remains at rest. One might object to this 
that since circular motion is still motion, it itself presupposes a reference 
point which is at rest. On the other hand, the reference point itself has to be 
constructed by means of circular motion. The possibility of a mass which is 
at rest can only be made intelligible by the model of circular motion. This is 
a vicious circle, and the realization that it is may be the reason why we find 
no reference to circular motion in Hegel's later expositions of the concepts of 
motion and matter. 
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i C. GYRATION 
The shortcomings of this reasoning could only be overcome by managing to 
conceive of rest and motion as being one. Although this is the intention in 
the model of circular motion, in this case rest and motion still fall apart. In 
t 
celestial corporality Hege1 recognizes a more perfect form of circular motion, 
! which he calls gyratory, and which can be observed empirically in the celestial 
spheres or bodies.13 
Here too he is especially interested in the principle involved. Compared 
with "the circular motion from which it originated", gyration has certain new 
qualities. The rotation it involves is no longer the motion of a single point on a 
circular path around a centre lying outside this point, but the circular motion 
of a whole spatially-extended system around an axis which lies inside it. 
What Hegel is evidently trying to say here, is that this intrinsic motion, which 
is characteristic of celestial bodies, makes the essence of mass more obvious, 
shows "how rest and motion exist in their substance or in mass". Mass is 
not an entity "which carries the principle of rest and motion outside itself ', 
but a "substance which rests in motion and moves in rest". 1s it possible to 
verify this in detail with the help of the model of gyratory motion? Only 
purely kinematic relations are of importance here, since the dynamic aspects 
which are here apparent on account of centrifugal force already presuppose 
the existence of mass. l4  
I have already observed that it is typical of gyratory motion that a spatially 
extended system such as a sphere should rotate as a whole. What we have 
here, therefore, is not only a single point moving in an othenvise empty 
circular path, but all the points of the sphere performing CO-axial gyrations 
together. If a section is made through the sphere vertical to its axis, the 
plane forms a circular area revolving around its centre during rotation, that 
is, revolving around its piercing point. If we consider all possible planes of 
the section, the rotation consists of "nothing but moving sections", and all 
the points on them are in circular motion. Seen from this point of view, the 
rotation is not one but an infinite multitude of circular motions: "it is the 
previous motion, posited or m~l t i~ l i ed" . ' ~  
The decisive characteristic here is that the whole system of all the points 
of the rotating sphere remains unchanged. During an infinitesimal rotation, 
every point occupies the position of its predecessor, so that altogether nothing 
is changed. Mathematically speaking, the system is transformed into itself, 
being invariant with respect to rotation. Consequently, no change of position 
l 3  Hegel GW 8.24. Hegel GW 8.25. Hegel GW 7.217 inter alia. Hegel GW 8.24. 
I4 Hegel GW 8.25. Hegel GW 8.24. 
l5 Hegel GW 8.27. Hegel GW 8.26. 
256 D. Wandschneider The Problem of Mass in Hegel 257 
can be established, since all points keep the Same distance from each other. 
There is no starting-point, nor is there any final point in the motions. The 
rotation effects no change of position in the system as a whole and unlike 
circular motion no longer refers to a presupposed fixed-point. Since all 
rotation is self-contained, Hegel can describe it "as a motion which refers to 
itself ' . I 6  
In accordance with this model of a motion referring to itself, mass is now 
characterized as the "unity of rest and motion". The whole is motion at rest. 
It is intrinsic motion, so to speak, and is self-contained. This perfect being- 
in-itself is its solidity, its self-identity. Solidity or massivity is therefore also 
a matter of time-bridging identity. It is "the motion which is taken up and 
preserved as identical with itself". In the supplements to his Jena Logic, 
Hegel also says that motion is bound within form. Here form obviously has 
the Same meaning as body, which in its turn is identical with mass.17 
As distinct from simple circularity, rotation is therefore a motion which, 
since it refers to itself, involves no change of place. It is, so to speak, an 
intrinsic motion. The question therefore arises as to how gyration can actually 
be determined as motion. A rotation too can only be known as a real motion 
on account of its reference to something unmoved which is independent of 
it. Hegel is well aware of this fact: "the rotation can only be recognized 
by means of a point which lies outside it, which means that in order for 
it to be real the point has to be necessary". The rotation of the Earth, for 
example, only becomes apparent in relation to a fixed star. 1s it not the case, I 
however, that one has already presupposed a mass as a point of reference? 
If the rotation is to be identified, a permanent mark has to be attached to the 
rotating system. 1s this not a reoccurrence of the problem which appeared in 
the model of circular motion?18 
The question of what it is that actually rotates in gyratory motion gives 
rise to a similar difficulty. It is obviously mass itself which rotates, and 
for this the model of gyratory motion has yet to provide an explanation. 1s 
this yet another vicious circle? In dealing with gyratory motion, Hegel is 
$ 
thinking predominantly of celestial bodies which actually exist. He points 
out that celestial corporality, as it is actually realized, brings out a principle 
I 
of materiality which in everyday experience, in the perception of a common 
stone for example, remains hidden. His consideration of this point must 
not be regarded simply as a desctiption, but as a radical reconstmction of 
Hegel GW 8.26ff. Cf. also Hegel GW 7.219ff. pass. 
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matter.19 
In this fundamental respect, his term gyratory motion can no longer be 
understood as refemng to real motion: "the difference here in what is motion 
is not real, it is not a difference in mass", that is to say, it is not to be Seen in 
relation to a point of reference having mass. Consequently, he also speaks of 
the "unreality of a sphere which is in gyratory motion". He observes that "the 
motion here does not yet have any reality as motion", being "motion which 
is taken up and presemed". What meaning, then, can still be attached to the 
concept of m~t ion?~ '  
Hegel's answer is that motion "refers to itself". He elucidates this by 
saying that "the whole is at rest, but the whole is just as much motion". The 
rotating system 
is the totality of motion. Although its time and revolution are involved 
in it, it withdraws down into itself below something which is higher. It 
therefore realizes a higher state of being-in-itself ... This sphere, which 
only moves for itself, is therefore posited for itself. It is absolute rest, 
which has no difference within itself. 
In other words, it is not real motion in time; for as such it would presuppose 
a fixed point of reference. It refers to itself, and as such is also rest. In this 
form, it cannot be a real motion, of Course, but may possibly be a kind of 
virtual motion, which is in fact also an unchangeableness. 1s anything like 
this at all c~nceivable?~' 
I think that one has simply to follow out this line of thought in order 
to recognize its consequences. Let us take another look at the structural 
elements of gyratory motion. There are the properties which have already 
been established for circular motion. Firstly, it is motion which returns into 
itself and therefore has duration; as a synthesis of past, present and future it 
is extension in time: 
It is something absolutely simple moving within itself; it is not a change 
of place, and is not now materially present with respect to a before and an 
after of what has been or has to be moved; it has reconciled the bad reality 
of time Seen in the separation of its elements. 
Secondly, the axial pole which remains at rest during the motion also defines a 
permanent place. The separation of time is therefore brought into a synthesis, 
despite space also being included. This is then the unity of space and time 
l9 Hegel GW 8.24. Hegel GW 7.250. 
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which Hegel regards as basic to place or l o c a l i t ~ . ~ ~  Circular motion itself is 
the synthesis of these two syntheses. Thirdly, as has been indicated, beyond 
the properties of circular motion there is a new property, specific to rotation. 
If the moved system is symmetrical with respect to rotation, as it is in the 
case of a sphere, it transforms itself into itself in any rotation on its axis. 
Consequently, the rotation does not change anything, its result is identity. 
Since such a process no longer has a definite direction in time, it may be said 
tobe temporally neutral. As has already been observed, this property is based 
on the fact that rotation represents a whole system of circular motions, which 
by working steadily together describe a change which changes nothing of 
the whole. One could speak of a synthesis of many circular motions, which 
integrate in such a way into identity. 
Our line of argument may therefore be summarized as follows: the prin- 
ciple of circular motion corresponds to a synthesis of two other syntheses, 
duration and locality. Beyond that, the principle of gyration has to be com- 
prehended as a synthesis of many circular motions, that is, as a synthesis of 
syntheses, of pairs of syntheses. We have, therefore, a threefold synthesis 
containing the other syntheses of duration, locality and their interconnection. 
The result of this synthesis is identity; not simply identity, however, but an 
identity which only Comes into being through non-identity, an identity which 
contains change and temporality as its basic elements. Because of this tem- 
porality, which is taken up and preserved, it is not the timeless identity of 
logic, but one which is simply neutral with respect to time. It is a being 
which, although it is in time, does not fall victim to it, remaining during the 
Course of time as a self-identical being-for-self. As such it contains extension 
in time and locality. 
Hegel's image of gyratory motion has now been replaced by a statement 
concerning stnicture. To interpret this as a threefold synthesis is certainly 
the outcome of a somewhat forced analysis. As has already been observed, 
however, it is also important that philosophy should decipher in a discursive 
manner the intuitive elements we find in the thinking of the young Hegel, 
many of which are neglected in the later writings. The corresponding line of 
argument in his Encyclopedia leads on to a conception of material mass as 
an existent unity of space and time. What is to be understood by this remains 
Open to discussion. The considerations developed here with the help of the 
models of circular and gyratory motion can provide us with certain leads. 
Massivity might be conceived of as the "unity of the moments of rest and 
motion", or more explicitly: as a self-identical being-for-self which is neutral 
with respect to time, and which contains the features of an extension in time 
22 Hegel GW 7.248f. Hegel Encyclopedia § 261, MM 9.56; tr. Petry I.237,5. 
and of spatio-temporal l ~ c a l i t ~ . ~ ~  
The conditional form has been chosen here on purpose. I want to emphasize 
this point once more, because we are dealing with a model. By this I mean 
that the condensed argumentation of the Encyclopedia should first be made 
comprehensible by starting from an intuitively conceived structure which is 
then rationally reconstructed. My aim has been to examine the heuristic value 
of this model, and to bring out certain prominent principles, which may help 
us to find a starting-point for solving the riddle of material being. 
D. EXEMPLIFICATION 
It would be extraordinarily satisfying if one could also provide an exempli- 
fication in modern physics of the interpretation thus developed. In the first 
place, one would have to think of the fundamental particles out of which 
matter, as we now understand it, is composed. It has to be expected that 
the structural elements of massive matter will appear in their purity only in 
relation to these particles, and not in relation to accidental macroscopic con- 
glomerates. One is therefore obliged to concentrate on elementary-particle 
physics. 
I What immediately strikes one here is the conception of ~ p i n . ~ ~  This is a 
quality typical of elementary particles, which in certain contexts represents 
i something resembling an intrinsic rotation. The related angular momentum 
has specific values for different types of particle. Important consequences 
result from the difference between half-integral and integral spins. Particles 
with a half-integral spin, so called fermions, are fundamentally incapable 
of existing together in the Same state. This offers an explanation for their 
impenetrability. It is questionable, however, whether the physical character of 
massivity is involved in such an explanation, for particles with integral spin, 
the so-called bosons, also have mass: mesons, for example, although they 
are composed of other particles, quarks, with a half-integral spin. Whether 
something like this is generally true is still empirically undecided. As for the 
rest, it now looks as if there are also massless particles with a half-integral 
spin - neutrinos, for example. Looking at the matter from an empirical point 
of view, one can therefore get no clear idea of the relation between spin and 
mass. 
If we free ourselves from the concrete image of gyratory motion, another 
physical interpretation of intrinsic motion offers itself. A particle is in any 
case a spatial localization of energy. As a result of Heisenberg's uncertainty 
23 Hege1 GW 8.23. 
l4 Bethge, K. and Schröder, U.E. 1986. 
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relation, however, this energy is not exactly fixed, but is subject to permanent 
fluctuations around the average, which in this case would correspond to the 
mass of the particle. This means that energy quanta are constantly being 
emitted and re-absorbed. Consequently, the particle is always surrounded 
by a cloud of fluctuating virtual particles as they are ~ a l l e d . ~ ~  According 
to the uncertainty-relation, however, one must not think of the particles and 
the cloud as existing independently. The elementary particle is nothing other 
than the continual production and disintegration of such a cloud, which in 
this way determines its surroundings or field, that is, its interaction with other 
particles. Seen from this point of view, the particle is not a static being within 
a field which is independent of it, but consists of a continual production of 
its own field. It is nothing other than the interaction with its own field, it is 
self-interaction. One modem physicist has observed that: "being and event 
are inseparable ideas because of the phenomenon of self-interaction ... being 
exists, because there is process. One can hardiy think of a more radical break 
with the classical doctrine of the foundations of the ~ o r l d . " ~ ~  
If this emission-absorption model is accepted as an interpretation of mass, 
one has to be aware that there are serious objections to it. It is a physical 
model for the relation between a charge connected with a mass and the field 
of this charge. It is not a model for mass itself. One might object to this, 
that the mass itself has to be comprehended in terms of charge; the theory 
of quarks offering some advantages in this respect. Another objection arises 
from the fact that the concept of a particle is already presupposed. Although 
this is true, the interpretation does endow the concept of mass with a dynamic 
nature: mass is a steady emission and re-absorption of the particles of a 
field. It is possible here that the particles of the fields themselves, at the most 
elementary level, are principally without mass, as for example in the case of 
photons and gluons, the quanta of the electro-magnetic or quark field. At 
present, however, this is an hypothesis which is empirically undecided. 
This emission-absorption model also provides an illustration of the previ- 
ously mentioned concept of an identity which is neutral in respect of time. 
Here, in accordance with the uncertainty relation, emission and absorption 
processes compensate each other around an average. The whole process 
therefore has no temporal direction; but in the end it is an identity which is 
neutral in respect of time. The young Hegel was already aware of something 
like this. In respect of the appearances of comets, he speaks of matter as: 
"a motion of opposed cuments, which immediately take each other up and 
preserve each other. Although the motion extinguishes itself, this extinction 
25 Davies, P. 1987, pp. 138ff. 
26 Ford, K.W. 1966, p. 208. 
is identical with its reinstatement, since it is the fall into the quiescent motion 
which gives rise to this whirl." Elsewhere: "At first, matter disintegrates ... 
into a multitude, which remains related to the unity and which has no existence 
in separation from this unity. It is a common medium into which everything 
which leaves this context will immediately return." The concept of a field 
is anticipated here by that of a medium, or "the force of mass". Hegel also 
considers: "the relation of the detemzinate being to its centre", adding that, 
I "only this determination of the concept is force". In the emission-absorption 
model this relation to the centre corresponds to the fluctuation of quanta of 
energy around an average, that is, to the field which surrounds the m a ~ s . ~ ~  
Another illustration of mass as an intrinsic motion which is at the same 
time rest, would be the idea that a particle can also be comprehended as a 
~ a v e . ~ *  Although such exemplifications by means of concrete events are 
certainly a help to our imagination, they also constitute the weakness of such 
models, since they presuppose real processes and real points of reference. . 
An abstract interpretation which avoids this disadvantage is that of gyratory 
1 motion regarded as a so-called symmetry transformation, a conception of 
great importance in modem physics. We understand by it a certain group of 
variations in a physical system which leave the system as a whole invariant. 
As we have Seen, it is precisely this that is typical of the rotation of a system 
I 
with a high degree of symmetry, like that of the sphere. According to the 
well-known Noether-theorem, certain invariants of this kind are connected 
with the conservation of a related physical quantity.29 It is important that the 
I conservation in time of the total energy of a system should be comprehended 
as a consequence of the invariance in respect of a time-shift. The conservation 
in time of the total momentum of a system corresponds to the invariance in 
respect of translations in space. Many conservation laws in physics may be 
explained in this way. 
It seems to me that the abstract interpretation of gyratory motion as such 
a symmetry transformation is probably what Hegel was driving at. The 
operation of symmetry is indeed not a real motion but a virtual variation of 
a system which leaves its functional unity as an invariant, and which is also 
1 associated with the conservation of a certain quantity in time - of energy, for 
example. Similarly, the rotational axis of a sphere can be comprehended as 
a quantity of conservation in respect of a rotation around the axis. It is in 
this way that Weizsäcker grasps the law of the conservation of energy as a 
'' Hegel GW 8.28. Hegel GW 8.36, similar Hegel GW 7.326. Hegel GW 7.238. Hegel 
GW 7.240. Hegel GW 8.36. Hegel GW 8.29. 
Ludwig, G. 1969; especially the contributions of E. Schrödinger and L. De Broglie. 
29 Weyl, H. 1955; Wigner, E.P. 1967; Bethge, K. and Schröder, U.E. 1986; Genz, H. 1987; 
Roman, P. 1961, Ch. IV, 1; Schmutzer, E. 1972. 
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modern interpretation of what Kant Sees as the postulate of the "persistence 
of substance". On the other hand, although Hegel's argumentation does not 
actually refer to an explicit principle, it already carries an implicit reference 
to the principle of symmetry. If we try to penetrate the aphoristic veneer 
of such formulations as "the atom is in reality only centre", we shall find in 
Hegel's philosophy of nature a surprisingly modern Pattern of t h o ~ ~ h t . ~ ~  
In this context, one has to refer to the outstanding importance which 
principles of symmetry have assumed in recent theoretical approaches to the 
structure of matter. One has to remember that nowadays a particle is simply 
identified with its symmetries. With explicit reference to the Platonic doctrine 
that particles are the embodiment of mathematical symmetries, Heisenberg 
maintains that in the beginning wassymmetry is certainly more correct than the 
thesis of Democritus that in the beginning was the particle: "The elementary 
particles embody the symmetries; they are the simplest representations of 
these symmetries, they are, however, only their ~onse~uences".~'  
Can we say, then, that abstract symmetries are that which constitutes 
concrete matter? Formulated like this, it does not sound a very plausible 
proposition. According to Ehe theory of relativity, matter consists of energy. 
What, then, is energy? It is certainly not the Same as mass, since there is 
massless energy - electro-magnetic radiation for example. Since mass is also 
something like a configuration of energy, an energetic system so to speak, 
the concept of symmetry is certainly relevant to understanding it. Symmetry 
enables us to think of systemic consewation within achange, which according 
to Hegel is essential to any understanding of mass. We can say, therefore, 
that whatever energy may be, mass is an energetic structure characterized by 
certain symmetries. 
Symmetry is basically the invariante of a whole system in a state of 
variation. It is the identity of the system under such varying conditions as, for 
example, a time-shift. Such a system therefore turns out to be an internally 
determined and independent functional whole. Symmetry is therefore the 
expression of the specific autonomy of a system, the regularity of its behaviour 
in a certain respect. According to Noether's theorem, it is the existence of the 
corresponding quantity of consewation, the consewation of energy during a 
time-shift for example. It is, therefore, a specific embodiment of the autonomy 
of the system, or as one could put it with Hegel: "existent being-for-self", 
the existence of its being-f~r-self.~~ 
Such an interpretation of the model of gyratory motion as related to the 
concepts of symmetry and quantity of consewation, is certainly extremely 
Cf. Weizsäcker, C.F. V. 1971. Teil IV, 2. Hegel GW 6.24, spaced in the original text. 
" Plato, Zlmaeus. 53c ff.; Schulz, D.J. 1966; Heisenberg, W. 1973, p. 280. 
32 Hegel Encyclopedia 3 261, MM 9.60 Addition; tr. Petry 1.240. 
suggestive. It would, however, be a mistake to regard it as the final truth 
concerning physics. It remains too metaphorical, and I think we can profit 
more from its heuristic significance. Certain structural relations important in 
the concept of mass can be illustrated by means of it, and it clearly provides 
us with a basic understanding of them. 
It has become apparent that the synthetic structures are mainly those which 
can be modelled by gyratory motion. This is only natural, since we are dealing 
here with a system or comprehensive entity. The aspect of symmetry is an 
immediate expression of this fact. With regard to mass, that is, in respect 
of fundamental particles, massivity has to be Seen as an integral property. 
It is obviously decisive for the logic of massivity, that it should have the 
comprehensive character pertaining to a system. 
E. RELATIVITY 
This point of view has an immediate implication in respect of the well-known 
problem of the divisibility of matter. If the fundamental particles have to be 
regarded as integral entities, the concept of divisibility no longer makes sense 
here. There are, of course, compound masses. It seems to me, however, that 
the assumption of the existence of infinitely small and indivisible particles 
involves no contradiction, and may even be regarded as necessary in the light 
of the Hegelian considerations developed here. Any attempt to divide such 
elements would not result in smaller particles, as might be expected, but in 
the generation of new elements which are the Same in principle as the original 
ones. The supposed division is in fact a multiplication, the process of which 
is governed by the principles of symmetry and by the laws of conservation 
associated with them. Such processes have been empirically familiar for 
some time n ~ w . ~ ~  
The model which has been discussed here, and which has been borrowed 
from the early writings of Hegel, can therefore help us to understand mass 
as an integral unity. In accordance with it, mass might be characterized as 
an intrinsic functional whole, or as the unity of rest and motion. This unity 
has a time-bridging identity, a being-for-self, which defines a real place. It is 
only under these conditions that the common concept of motion employed in 
mechanics has any real meaning. From this premise we can now draw certain 
conclusions concerning the concepts of motion and matter. 
In so far as mass defines a real place, every mass can be a point of reference 
for motion. Mass as such is by definition at rest, although in relation to another 
mass it can of course be in a state of motion. In so far as mass is not fixed 
" Bethge, K. and Schröder, U.E. 1986. 
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as motion or rest, since according to its concept it is defined as the unity of 
rest and motion, "rest and motion are taken up and preserved in mass. Mass 
is indifferent to both of them, being just as capable of motion as it is of rest." 
Hegel exploits the fact that in German the words for carrier and inert have a 
common root, and punningly asserts that mass is inert because it is the carrier 
of both motion and rest: "In so far as it is at rest, it is at rest and does not 
of its own accord turn into motion; if it is in motion, it is simply in motion, 
and does not of its own accord turn into rest. Rest and motion are therefore 
infused into it by another being." They are there on account of an external 
influence, which might help to explain the resistance which mass offers to 
a~celerat ion.~~ 
It is therefore Part of the concept of mass, that it can be both in motion 
and at rest. Mass moved can also be regarded as at rest, can have different 
states of motion according to its point of reference. One might say that 
precisely because mass is capable of rest, its motion is always relative, or 
that the motion of mass is identical with relative motion. Here we have the 
classic principle of the relativity of motion. A decisive modification here is, 
however, that in this argumentation the principle can only be applied to the 
motion of mass. 
This has a surprising corollary, which throws light on the central point of 
the Special theory of relativity. The motion of something which is not mass, 
of light for example, cannot be a relative motion. Consequently, something 
which is not mass cannot be at rest, but can only be in motion. If it were not, 
it would be mass in contradiction of its own concept, the character of mass, 
and would be govemed by the principle of relativity. As something which 
is not mass, it can only be in motion, and this motion cannot be a relative 
motion. It must, therefore, be an absolute motion, one which is independent 
of any specific point of reference. Although Hegel does in fact draw this 
conclusion, he provides no explicit argumentation for it. He simply states 
that the being of light is "the absolute velocity". Findlay is therefore justified 
in maintaining that one can find a flavour of relativity physics in some of the 
things he says about light.35 Thinking critically about contemporary science, 
and more particularly in opposition to Newton's corpuscular theory of light, 
Hegel anticipates one of the crucial principles of modern physics. 
As I have already observed, mass or massivity are only one aspect of 
matter. It is simply this one topic that has been treated here. In more general 
terms, the problem of gravity and gravitation is directly related to that of 
M Hegel GW 8.23. Hegel GW 8.23. Hegel Encyclopedia 5 264, M M  9.64; tr. Petry 1.244. 
Hegel GW 8.23. Hegel 3 265, MM 9.66 Addition and MM 9.66f.; tr. Petry 1.246. 
35 Wege1 GW 8.35. Hegel Encyclopedia 3 275 Addition, MM 9.112 Addition; tr. Petry 
11.12.30. Findlay, J.N. 1964'. p. 279. 
matter. This is, however, a separate topic, and to enter into it would be to go 
beyond of the scope of the present 
I shall simply conclude, therefore, by observing that a consideration of 
basic principles such as that carried out here, is a matter of particuiar interest 
not only to philosophy itself, but also to anyone reflecting philosophically 
on physics, especially if the Situation being dealt with has not yet been 
clarified empirically but appears to be worthy of close attention. It is important 
to investigate a philosopher of Hegel's rank, not only in an historical and 
philological manner, but also in respect of the ways in which his thoughts 
might be developed from a systematic point of view. 
3h Falkenburg, B. 1987, ch. 5.; Ihmig, K.-N. 1989, pt. 111; Wandschneider, D. 1982, pp. 190ff. 
